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EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/RM

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MEMORANDUM

October 30, 1962

TO: G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

FROM: G/RM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

SUBJECT: The Rostow Committee Memorandum on "Negotiation"

The Rostow subcommittee of EXCOM has prepared two drafts of a paper on the general subject of negotiation with the Soviets. A memorandum of October 26 on which we have commented in a memorandum to you of that date, and a revised version of the paper dated October 27 have been circulated. Another revised version is due for issuance today and discussion tomorrow. It is not, however, clear whether these draft versions are being informally circulated to EXCOM, and we would like to note again our continuing concern about one or two aspects of this paper.

Assuming as the revised versions of this paper do, that Soviet offensive weapons will be removed from Cuba before a major US-Soviet negotiation, the chief purpose of such negotiation would be to explore and encourage any disposition by the Soviet leaders to seek a status vivendi on one or more of the major issues of arms control, disarmament, Berlin, European Security, and Southeast Asia. The arms control and disarmament portions are being reviewed by ACDA, which has participated actively in the Rostow committee while reviewing these matters in ACDA. It is, therefore, too early to know what provisions other than non-diffusion of nuclear weapons and the arms control proposal for outer space, will be included.

The new focus on European security will include the possibility of an exchange of NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression assurances, and also will probably retain the idea of US and Soviet declarations of intent not to procure ICBMs for land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than the US and USSR. This proposal may even be broadened to include a much wider limitation on land missile deployment. While the US does not at present have plans to deploy such missiles in Europe, we believe it is not in the US interest to tie our hands indefinitely in a commitment which may disturb some of our Allies deeply if we even raise it, unless there are compensating advantages.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

R. Bokwirth

DATE

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[which have yet to be found] We strongly believe that the idea of a multilateral seabased force should be addressed on its own merits and not forced on our Allies by a US-Soviet move to rule out the option of land deployment. The question of removing Jupiters from Turkey is not specifically addressed but would presumably follow from such US and Soviet declarations. We think that the question of removing the Jupiters remains especially sensitive since any precipitous or apparently evasive move directed toward this end would be misconstrued by many as evidence of an under the table US-Soviet deal.

especially if the Sov pull out of Cuba
completely.]

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Mr. Kithen 38
October 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NSC

SUBJECT: Negotiations

1. Khrushchev's letter is more likely, in our view, to reflect a decision to disengage from offensive weapons in Cuba, saving as much face as possible, than to represent a tactical maneuver or gimmick.

2. In a larger sense, this decision might portend a major shift in Soviet policy. A few months ago we had said that Khrushchev was reaching a point in his post-Sputnik offensive where, if he could not score an early success, he would probably seek some relief from the pressures which that offensive had placed on him. We had anticipated that he might seek such a success in either Cuba, Berlin, or weapons development. We had also anticipated that, if we stood firm and denied him that success, the chances would be increased of his seeking relief from these pressures through relaxation.

3. Against this background, our posture in the present crisis should be designed to:

(a) make clear that the Cuban issue must be settled by the prompt elimination of Soviet offensive weapons, and without any offsetting concessions other than pure atmospherics, e.g., a Latin American nuclear-free zone;

(b) make equally clear that we are prepared to undertake immediate negotiations with the USSR on arms control and other issues, that we are ready to go to a Summit on these matters as soon as Cuba is out of the way, and that we would be willing to concert now about the specific items to be taken up at a Summit - even while Cuba was being got out of the way.

4. A memorandum is attached which outlines the approach that might be made to a Summit meeting under the strategy discussed above. Its substantive treatment of the issues to be taken up at a Summit is the same as that contained in the October 26 paper on "Negotiations" which was co-ordinated with the interested regional Bureaus and ACDA.

W. W. Rostow

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October 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Negotiation

A few days ago you asked us to prepare a paper on negotiation and Summity.

We prepared one, discussed it October 26 with the interested Bureaus and ACDA, and then revised it to reflect their comments.

This morning we revised it again. The result is attached. The substantive treatment of the subjects for negotiation is the same as that in the October 26 draft, but the introduction and conclusion have been altered to focus more clearly on the optimum assumption made in the October 26 paper, i.e., that the Cuban crisis was resolved before a high level broad US-Soviet negotiation.

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October 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Negotiation

1. Assuming the optimum setting posited in the October 26 paper on "Negotiation"--i.e., that Soviet offensive weapons were removed from Cuba before a major U.S.-Soviet negotiation--it would still seem desirable quickly to proceed to such a negotiation at the Summit.

2. Khrushchev had in recent months given us a number of reasons to believe that he might be at a cross-roads in policy. The Cuban adventure represented his attempt to explore the "hard fork" in the road. Having been rebuffed in this attempt, he might well conclude that his best chance of making world history in his remaining term lay in exploring the alternative option with characteristic vigor. Proceeding to a Summit might both encourage him in such a disposition and permit us to draw some early profit from it.

3. The agenda

3. The agenda for a Summit would be the same as that
posed in the October 26 paper:

(a) Arms Control.

(i) US and Soviet non-diffusion declarations;
(ii) US and Soviet declarations of intent not to
facilitate procurement of MRBM's for land deployment in NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR. Such deploy-
ment is not in US interest, in either Western Europe or the
Satellites. The US would only enter into such an exchange of
declarations, however, if full allied consultations did not
surface objection. The US would base its declaration on the
previously stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procure-
ment for a multilateral sea-based force. Concurrently, we
might press ahead with the small pilot NATO Southern Command
multilateral seaborne force (Italians, Turks, Greeks, US, and
perhaps Canadians) proposed by Ambassador Pinletter in Polto 506
as an earnest of our intent to provide allied participation
in MRBM deployment via the sea-based route,

(iii) Safeguards against war by miscalculation
which are already in the US disarmament position, e.g., exchange
of US and

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of US and Soviet military observation teams, direct communication facilities between US and Soviet national command centers, etc. Agreement on these items would seem particularly appropriate in the wake of a major crisis.

(iv) Review of key differences of approach in the Geneva Disarmament and Test Ban negotiations, to determine whether any useful new directive can be given to the US and Soviet negotiators. Arms control might be the more important in a period after the Cuban crisis, since such a period would probably be marked by feverish Soviet attempts to redress the nuclear imbalance which had been so evident and so damaging to the USSR during that crisis.

(b) Berlin. We would make clear that the troop issue was non-negotiable, but that we were prepared to reach a "Solution C" type agreement, which did not purport to be a final Berlin settlement but which put the matter on ice and allowed East Germans to substitute for the Soviets in access functions. This could be dressed up in various ways - UN presence, no nuclear arms in Berlin, etc. - for face-saving purposes

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[purposes. If the Soviets were interested, this matter could be pursued further at the foreign minister level with other parties concerned.

(c) Germany. We might suggest to the Soviets that feasible aspects of the German question (on which we have consulted with our allies) - mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers - might also be pursued further at the foreign minister level with other interested parties.

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(d) Future Summits. It might be agreed that the heads of the UK and French governments would be invited to meet in a future quadripartite Summit, to review any work done at the foreign minister level on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere than the present crisis.

4. It is just barely possible that a vigorous attempt to do business with Khrushchev on these items, surfacing any

agreed]

[agreed flexibility in allied positions that we have hitherto held in reserve (e.g., East German "substitution") and limiting the agenda to proposals which are not patently non-negotiable, could achieve a measure of success.

If so, such a meeting--in the wake of a successful firm stand on Cuba--might conceivably mark a turning point of sorts in the cold war. It might register some immediate--if limited--success, be followed by more productive talks at the foreign minister level than have hitherto been possible, and possibly lead to one or more quadripartite Summits at which further progress could be made.

5. If this course commends itself, we should proceed to immediate consultation with our allies.]

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